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THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT IN ADDRESSING
AGGRESSIVE ENFORCEMENT OF “WALKING WHILE BLACK OR BROWN”
ROBERTO CONCEPCIÓN, Jr.
What may arouse hostility is not the fact of aggressive patrol but its indiscriminate use so
that it comes to be regarded not as crime control but as a new method of racial harassment.
KERNER COMMISSION REPORT (1968)1

INTRODUCTION
Imagine being sent to the corner store by your mother to buy ketchup for a dinner of
chicken and French fries. On your way back you see two plainclothes officers with badges in front
of your building and three uniformed officers across the street. When you reach your building, the
two plainclothes officers stop you and begin asking you questions, including where you are coming
from, where you are headed, and what you have in your bag. After answering that you have ketchup
in your bag, one of the officers asks you to raise your hands and then asks you what you have in
your pockets. The officer starts to frisk you, first shaking your pockets, then putting a hand in your
left pocket, then patting your arms down. Once he finishes, the officer asks you for your ID and
takes your name down on a notepad. The other officer looks in your bag and inspects the ketchup.
The officers ask you for your apartment number and ring the bell. They then ask your mother
through the intercom to “please come down and identify your son.” Your mother runs down the
stairs, thinking you are dead or hurt, and collapses on the steps when she sees you standing by the
officers, uninjured. One of the officers approaches your mother, laughing, and hands her the
ketchup. The officers then let you go. 2 After returning to your apartment, reality sets in: the police
* Associate, Berke-Weiss & Pechman LLP; former Associate Counsel, LatinoJustice PRLDEF. The opinions expressed in
this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily state or reflect the view of LatinoJustice or the any of the other
groups litigating Ligon v. City of New York in the Southern District of New York. First, I take this opportunity to thank
LatinoJustice for allowing me to write this Article while working as an Associate Counsel and as part of the Ligon litigation
team. Second, I thank Juan Cartagena and Kyle Valenti for their invaluable comments. Lastly, I thank the members of the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change for their assistance in seeing the Article through to
publication.
1
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 161 (1968) [hereinafter “KERNER
COMMISSION REPORT”].
2

Such was the experience of J.G., a black seventeen year old who was a named plaintiff in Ligon v. City of
New York, a class action lawsuit challenging the New York Police Department’s (“NYPD’s”) stop-and-frisk policies and
practices in and around thousands of private residential buildings around the City of New York enrolled in the Trespass
Affidavit Program, also known as “Operation Clean Halls.” 925 F.Supp.2d 478, 483-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). J.G.’s experience
of being suspected of trespassing for simply entering his apartment building is not an aberration. See NEW YORK LAWYERS
FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON POLICE INTERACTIONS WITH PUBLIC
HOUSING RESIDENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (Sept. 2008) (“Many residents report frequent police abuse of authority,
particularly around the enforcement of trespass laws. For example in [certain public housing units operated by the New York
City Public Housing Authority] approximately 30% of the residents surveyed reported they had been charged with
trespassing, despite the fact that they lived there. Approximately 70% of those surveyed at the Thomas Jefferson Houses
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stopped you for “walking while black (or brown).” 3
This is the reality of “stop-and-frisk” policing. The story described above is not an isolated
incident, nor is the racial identity of J.G. coincidental. Blacks and Latinos, particularly those in lowincome neighborhoods, are subjected to this policing tool that, as Michelle Alexander writes,
“would result in public outrage and scandal if committed in middle-class white neighborhoods.”4
But this reality is far from new. In 1968, the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio
announced the constitutional standards for stop-and-frisk practices, and acknowledged “[t]he
wholesale harassment [of racial minorities] by certain elements of the police community.” 5 Citing
the findings of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the
Terry Court wrote:
The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
found that “in many communities, field interrogations are a major source of
friction between the police and minority groups.” It was reported that the friction
caused by “misuse of field interrogations” increases “as more police departments
adopt ‘aggressive patrol’ in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and
question persons on the street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or
whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evident.” While the frequency with
which “frisking” forms a part of field interrogation practice varies tremendously
with the locale, the objective of the interrogation, and the particular officer, it
cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in police-community tensions.
This is particularly true in situations where the “stop and frisk” of youths or
minority group members is “motivated by the officers’ perceived need to
maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by
humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets.” 6
Supporters of the aggressive use of stop-and-frisk as a proactive policing tool perceive a
much different reality. For them, stop-and-frisk is a valuable crime-fighting technique7 that
reported that they had been repeatedly stopped by police officers when simply coming and going around their homes.”); cf.
Julie K. Brown, In Miami Gardens, Store Video Catches Cops in the Act, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 22, 2013) (discussing how
a twenty-eight year old black male received more than sixty citations for trespassing, most of which were issued at his place
of
employment),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/11/21/v-fullstory/3769823/in-miami-gardens-store-videocatches.html.
3
See generally Clyde Haberman, A Shooting, and Shooting from the Hip, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at B1;
Editorial, Walking While Black in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, at A16; George Yancy, Op-Ed., Walking While
Black in the “White Gaze,” N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com
/2013/09/01/walking-while-black-in-the-white-gaze/; David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546 & n.10 (1997); DAVID
A. HARRIS, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS
(1999), available at https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways.
4
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 96
(2010); see also id. at 120-24.
5

392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968); see discussion infra Part II.a.

Id. at 14 n.11 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183-84 (1967)).
6

7

See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK STATE, REPORT ON THE NEW YORK CITY
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disproportionately affects racial minorities only because racial minorities are disproportionately
represented among criminal offenders. 8 Forty-five years after Terry, stop-and-frisk remains a major
source of tension between the police and minority communities.
Despite efforts to reform local police departments, and despite the availability of federal
legislative measures to challenge discriminatory stop-and-frisk practices in problematic
departments, the abusive use of stop-and-frisk persists in the United States.9 In order to address
seemingly unresolvable tensions, this Article argues that these practices should be challenged by
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK” PRACTICES [hereinafter “NY ATTORNEY GENERAL 1999 STOP & FRISK REPORT”]
45, 56 (1999) (describing the role of stop-and-frisk in furthering the New York City Police Department’s goals of “order
maintenance, deterrence, crime prevention, and a direct attack on gun violence”), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk.pdf. But see Richard Rosenfeld & Robert
Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010, 31 JUST. Q.,
117-18 (2014) (finding few significant effects of stop, question, and frisk on robbery and burglary rates) (“We cannot
conclude from the current investigation that SQF has no impact on crime in New York. But we can be more certain that, if
there is an impact, it is so localized and dissipates so rapidly that it fails to register in annual precinct crime rates, much less
the decade-long citywide crime reductions that public officials have attributed to the policy.”); see also Jennifer Peltz, Stop
and Frisks Down in NYC; Bloomberg Cites Crime Drop But Critics Say It’s Reverse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 28, 2013,
3:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/28/stop-and-frisks-nyc_n_3832082.html (citing lower crime rates in
New York City in 2013, despite a decrease in street stops).
The effectiveness of a law enforcement tool, though, has no place in judging the constitutionality of police behavior. As the
Supreme Court recently observed, “[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off
the table”—and the unconstitutional use of stop-and-frisk as policing tool is one of them. District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 676 (2008); see also Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on
Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2014, at A1 (recounting Police Commissioner William Bratton’s statement, “We will
not break the law to enforce the law,” made during a press conference at which New York City’s Mayor Bill de Blasio
announced his intention to withdraw the appeal of the stop-and-frisk litigation).
8
See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 73-74 (2002)
(compiling the opinions of police officers and a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent, among others). In a federal
class action lawsuit challenging the New York City Police Department’s stop-and-frisk practices, Judge Shira Scheindlin of
the Southern District of New York rejected the testimony of the city’s experts that the race of crime suspects was the
appropriate benchmark for examining racial bias in stops. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). The district court recognized that the city and its highest officials believed that blacks and Hispanics should be
stopped at the same rate as their proportion of the local criminal suspect population, but the court found the city’s reasoning
flawed because the stopped population was overwhelmingly innocent, not criminal. See id.
9
Although instances of police brutality—the torturing of black security guard Abner Louima in Brooklyn
with a broomstick, the firing of forty-one bullets at African immigrant Amadous Diallo in the Bronx, and the videotaped
beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles—garner the most media attention, they represent only a fraction of unlawful conduct
in which some police officers engage. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using
Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 360 (2011); Michael Powell, In a
Volatile City, a Stern Line on Race and Politics, N.Y. TIMES. July 22, 2007, at A1; Patterns of Police Violence, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2001, at A22; see also NY ATTORNEY GENERAL 1999 STOP & FRISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 4 (“Many of the
complaints [received by the Attorney General], if not most, revolved around lower-level police involvement in the everyday
lives of minority residents, rather than celebrated cases of extreme abuse.”). Police misconduct, however, includes a broader
range of police practices that infringe on the civil rights of individuals where unconstitutional racial profiling is just one
example. Id. at 360-61. An emerging consensus among police experts considers misconduct by individual officers the result
of inadequate management policies and practices (the “rotten barrel” theory), as opposed to the result of bad individual
officers (the “rotten apple” theory). Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct:
A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON. U. C.R. L.J. 479, 483-84 (2009).
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relying on a statute already on the books, but one which traditionally has not been relied on in this
context: the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 10 which prohibits racial discrimination in the provision of
municipal services in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling. 11
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part II of this Article provides an overview of the
legal terrain of stop-and-frisk. It summarizes the constitutional standards for stop-and-frisk, and
discusses how this highly discretionary police practice has resulted in the racial profiling of
pedestrians on a national scale. Part II also briefly describes the traditional mechanisms for
addressing police misconduct and shares common criticisms of those measures. Part III explores
the viability of relying on the FHA’s disparate impact theory to challenge the overly aggressive
provision of police services in minority neighborhoods where intentional discrimination cannot be
demonstrated. It does so first by reviewing the legal standard for a disparate impact claim and then
by analyzing how courts have treated claims relating to the discriminatory provision of police
services. Part III discusses how a plaintiff must proceed in using the FHA to challenge a police
department’s stop-and-frisk practices under the disparate impact theory, and notes the advantages
of doing so. Part IV concludes that an FHA disparate impact claim represents a promising means
of sustainably remedying discriminatory police practices in minority neighborhoods.
I.

RACIAL PROFILING IN PEDESTRIAN STOPS AND FRISKS

A. The Constitutional Standards for the Practice of Stop-and-Frisk
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, 12
provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”13 The United States Supreme Court
has affirmed time and time again that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness.’”14 The Supreme Court has held that under the Fourth Amendment, police are
constitutionally permitted to “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the
officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be
afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”15 Such an investigative detention is now commonly
referred to as a “Terry stop.”16
Whether a Terry stop has occurred depends on “whether a reasonable person would feel
free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” 17 The relevant inquiry
10

42 U.S.C.A. § 3601 (2013).

11

Id. § 3604(b).

12

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961).

13

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

14

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).

15

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

16

See, e.g., Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 565.

17
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). But see Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial
Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1424 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he constitutional regulation of stops and
searches is based in part on the premise that the average citizen feels free to ignore an armed police officer who asks for
identification, or to look in the trunk, and that the nearly universal compliance with such demands is voluntary. . . [which]
is a convenient fiction even under ordinary circumstances . . . .”).
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is “whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police
conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the
police presence and go about his business.’” 18 In order for a Terry stop to comply with the Fourth
Amendment, the stop must be based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be
afoot.”19 The police officer must have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been,
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” 20
The Supreme Court has recognized that a police officer making a Terry stop “should not
be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect.” 21 For this reason, “a
law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons
that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted.” 22
In order for a police officer to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the officer must have “reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” 23 However, “[n]othing in Terry can be
understood to allow a generalized ‘cursory search for weapons’ or indeed, any search whatever for
anything but weapons.”24
B. Racial Profiling: A National Problem
One scholar has commented that, through Terry, the Supreme Court gave its “legal
blessing” to stop-and-frisk, thereby legitimizing a highly discretionary police practice. 25 This
discretion includes where and whom to target. 26 Racial profiling27 studies have confirmed that
police exercise their discretion regarding whom to stop and search in a discriminatory fashion. 28
Provided below is a sample of the findings in these studies:


In New Jersey, data revealed that less than 15 percent of all drivers on the New Jersey
Turnpike were black, yet black motorists constituted more than 35 percent of those
stopped and more than 73 percent of those arrested. This disparity did not result from
blacks violating the traffic laws at higher rates. Instead, the data showed that blacks

18

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)).

19

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.

20

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33).

21

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24).

22

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 146).

23

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

24

Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93-94.

25

HARRIS, supra note 8 at 39; see also Alexander, supra note 4, at 121. Harris has also observed that
following Terry, the Supreme Court addressed stop-and-frisk only on a handful of occasions, for the most part expanding
the scope of police discretion. HARRIS, supra note 8 at 39.
26

ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 121.

The term “racial profiling” can be defined as occurring “whenever a law enforcement officer questions,
stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that members of that person’s racial
or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is investigating.” Gross
& Livingston, supra note 17, at 1415. For somewhat different definitions of racial profiling, see id. at 1416 n.6.
27

28

For an in-depth review of these studies, see HARRIS, supra note 8, at 53-69.
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and whites violated traffic laws at the same rate. 29 A later study conducted by the
Attorney General of New Jersey revealed that the overwhelming majority of searches
conducted of motor vehicles (77.2 percent) were of those driven by blacks and
Hispanics.30


In Maryland, blacks constituted 17 percent of the drivers along I-95, but 72 percent of
those stopped and searched.31 And even though only 21 percent of all drivers were
racial minorities (Latinos, Asians, and blacks), those groups constituted nearly 80
percent of those stopped and searched.32



In Volusia County, Florida, a local newspaper obtained 148 hours of video footage
documenting almost 1,100 roadside stops conducted by deputies. Only five percent of
the highway drivers were black or Latino, yet blacks and Latinos constituted more
than 70 percent of those stopped and more than 80 percent of those whose cars were
searched.33



In Illinois, state troopers assigned to a drug interdiction program called Operation
Valkyrie singled out Latino motorists. Although Latinos comprised less than eight
percent of the Illinois population and took fewer than three percent of the personal
vehicle trips in the state, they accounted for about 30 percent of the motorists stopped
by drug interdiction officers for discretionary offenses such as driving one to four
miles over the speed limit. Latinos were less likely to have illegal contraband in their
vehicles than whites.34



In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, racial minorities constituted approximately 56 percent
of the city’s population, but almost 86 percent of those stopped on one particular week
and more than 71 percent on another week.35



In Oakland, California, blacks were approximately twice as likely as whites to be
stopped and three times as likely to be searched. 36

29

Id. at 53-56; see also State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).

30

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE
POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 27 (1999), available at
www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf.
31

HARRIS, supra note 8, at 61-62.

32

ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 131.

33

Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Driver Is Key to Stops in I-95 Videos, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23,
1992, at A1; David A. Harris, Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual
Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 561-62 (1997).
34

See HARRIS, supra note 3.

35

Id.

36

ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 132.
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In Akron and Toledo, Ohio, blacks were more than two times as likely to be ticketed
as all other drivers. In Franklin County and Dayton, blacks were 1.8 times as likely to
be ticketed as other drivers.37

The alarmingly consistent pattern of racial profiling illustrated by these studies is not
limited to the traffic context. Racial profiling in pedestrian stops has also been the subject of study. 38
As David Harris writes, “What traffic stops are to profiling on the highways, stops and frisks are to
profiling on the streets.”39 A study commissioned by the Attorney General of New York, for
example, found that black pedestrians were six times more likely to be stopped than whites in New
York City.40 Similarly, Latino pedestrians were four times more likely to be stopped than whites. 41
However, stops of blacks and Latinos were less likely to result in arrests than those of whites. 42
Although the NYPD claimed its stop-and-frisk program was critical to removing guns from the
street, only 2.5 percent of the stops made on suspicion of weapons possession effectuated by the
now-defunct Street Crime Unit—an elite unit of plainclothes officers tasked with recovering illegal
firearms—resulted in an arrest for weapons possession.43 Presumably, this is because most of the
individuals stopped did not have any weapons.
Rather than respond to the troubling data by, for instance, questioning the effectiveness of
its stop-and-frisk practices or engaging in a constructive dialogue with the community to assuage
their serious concerns, the NYPD increased the number of pedestrian stops significantly, turning a
blind eye to the disproportionate and ineffectual stop rates of racial minorities. Between January
2004 and June 2012, the NYPD conducted over 4.4 million Terry stops, with the number of stops
per year rising sharply from 314,000 in 2004 to a high of 686,000 in 2011.44 In 52 percent of the
4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black; 45 in 31 percent, the person was Latino.46 The
disproportionate stop rates were not attributable to blacks and Latinos engaging in illegal activity
at higher rates than whites. In fact, the seizure rate for weapons and other illegal contraband was
higher with white pedestrians (1.4% and 2.3%, respectively) than black (1% and 1.8%, respectively)

37
HARRIS, supra note 8, at 68. The calculations were based on whether a black person was more likely to be
ticketed than a white, Latino, or Asian person. Because other minorities, particularly Latinos, complained of being targeted
for ticketing, the calculations understated the scope of the problem. Id.
38
See generally HARRY G. LEVINE ET AL., TARGETING BLACKS FOR MARIJUANA: POSSESSION ARRESTS OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA, 2004-2008 (2010); HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, NEW YORK
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY, 1997-2007
(2008); Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the
Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N 813 (2007).
39

HARRIS, supra note 8, at 38.

40

NY ATTORNEY GENERAL 1999 STOP & FRISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 95, 111 (1999).

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 53, 53 n.32, 58, 117 n.23.

44

Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 558.

45

Id.

46

Id.
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or Latino pedestrians (1.1% and 1.7%, respectively).47 The significant number of total pedestrian
stops does not reflect rampant illegal activity. Only 6 percent of all stops resulted in an arrest and
another 6 percent resulted in a summons. 48 The remaining 88 percent resulted in no further
enforcement action, suggesting that the NYPD stopped many innocent New Yorkers. 49
The ramifications of racial profiling, both in pedestrian stops and in general, are extensive.
Patterns of police misconduct have a financial impact on municipalities and local police
departments due to the costs of litigation and settlement.50 For example, one group estimated that
nationally, from January to December of 2010, more than $346 million was spent on misconductrelated civil judgments and settlements. 51 In New York City between 1994 and 2000, the
municipality faced damages amounting to $180 million in police misconduct cases. 52 Similarly,
during the 1990s, Detroit paid $124 million in lawsuits related to police misconduct. 53 According
to one scholar, the evidence suggests that any deterrent effect of damages remains weak and that
police departments regard civil litigation and monetary damages as “not [their] problem” or simply
part of the “cost of doing business.”54
In addition to the financial repercussions of police misconduct, there is significant
evidence that this misconduct “negatively impacts the perceived legitimacy of police officers and

47

Id.

48

Id. For a report analyzing the extent to which stop-and-frisk in New York City yields convictions, see
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK STATE, REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY
POLICE
DEPARTMENT’S
STOP-AND-FRISK
PRACTICES
1-2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_NOV_2013.pdf (finding, among other things, that
close to half of all arrests that result from the stop-and-frisk program result in a criminal conviction or violation; less than
one in four arrests (1.5% of all stops) resulted in a jail or prison sentence; one in fifty arrests (about 0.1% of all stops) led to
a conviction for a crime of violence; one in fifty arrests (about 0.1% of all stops) led to a conviction for possession of a
weapon; almost one in four (24.7%) arrests were dismissed before arraignment or resulted in a non-criminal charge; and
racial disparities in stops were found through arrest, disposition, and sentencing).
49

Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 573; cf. JOSÉ LUIS MORÍN, LATINO/A RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES:
PERSPECTIVES AND APPROACHES 129 (2d ed. 2005) (“[L]aw enforcement officers too often view the hip-hop fashions,
tattoos, and other forms of expression currently in vogue among Latino/a youth—whether or not they actually belong to a
gang—as synonymous with crime.”). The city argued, in part, that many stops effectuated by the NYPD interrupt a crime
from occurring. Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 575. The city, however, failed to offer evidence at trial of “a single stop that was
based on reasonable suspicion, and . . . prevented the commission of a crime, but . . . did not result in probable cause for an
arrest.” Id. The court found it “highly implausible” that successful preventive stops took place frequently enough such that
in 88% of the NYPD’s 4.4 million stops, the suspicion giving rise to the stop was properly placed. Id.
50

Simmons, supra note 9, at 366.

51

CATO INSTITUTE, 2010 NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT STATISTICS AND REPORTING PROJECT POLICE
MISCONDUCT STATISTICAL REPORT (2010), available at http://www.policemisconduct.net/statistics/2010-annual-report.
This figure excludes sealed settlements, court costs, and attorney fees. Id. Of the 6,613 law enforcement officers involved
in reported allegations of misconduct that met the Project’s criteria for tracking purposes, 1,575 (23.8%) were involved in
excessive force reports—the most prominent type of report. Id.
52
David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—or Replace—the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 156 (2009).
53

Id.

54

Id. at 157.
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increases police-community tensions.”55 When friction between the police and the community
exists, it becomes difficult for the two to forge partnerships aimed at dealing with crime, thereby
undermining the community-policing model that has become popular in the United States. 56
C. Inadequate Solutions to a National Problem
Despite that police misconduct is a national issue,57 the federal government has historically
exhibited reluctance in investigating and prosecuting local law enforcement officers for misconduct
at the first instance, preferring to serve as a “backstop.”58 Although state governments have retained
primary responsibility for regulating their officers, states have failed to prosecute officers for
misconduct.59 Generally, the federal government uses tools to combat police misconduct only when
the states fail to act.60
Commentators have observed that, although Congress has recognized the need for federal
authority to address police misconduct, federal legislative measures thus far have fallen short of
precipitating widespread institutional reform within police departments. 61 First, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
permits victims of police misconduct to bring civil lawsuits in federal court for violations of their
constitutional rights.62 Critics of § 1983 argue that it is an ineffective tool to remedy police
55
Simmons, supra note 9, at 367; see HARRIS, supra note 8, at 52 (observing that civil rights activists in the
1960s and beyond “regarded stops and frisks as a major source of tension between police and minorities in inner cities”);
ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 122 (explaining how, in ghetto communities, “many black youth automatically ‘assume the
position’ when a patrol car pulls up, knowing full well that they will be detained and frisked no matter what”); KERNER
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 164 (describing the use of stop-and-frisk as having “the potential for becoming a
major source of friction between police and minority groups”).
56
Simmons, supra note 9, at 368; see also Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 483 (stating that “[c]itizen
cooperation, in turn, is diminished by patterns of abusive police conduct that undermines public trust”); cf. Morín, supra
note 49, at 125 (“Discrimination, segregation, ‘frustrated hopes,’ the ‘legitimization of violence,’ and ‘powerlessness’—
terms used by the Kerner Commission to identify the basic causes for the disturbances of the 1960s in places such as Los
Angeles and New York—are words that, in many ways, are still applicable to the circumstances under which many
Latinos/as, African Americans, and other people of color live within U.S. society.”) (citation omitted).
57

See generally Simmons, supra note 9, at 353 (noting that police brutality has long been an issue within
American law enforcement agencies).
58

Id. at 368 n.79.

59

Id. at 368-69.

60

Id. at 369.

61

Id. For a broader review of the major strategies for police reform, the positive achievements of these
strategies, and their limitations to effectuating organizational change, see Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 489-500
(discussing self-regulation, constitutional litigation, tort litigation, criminal prosecution of police officers, Blue Ribbon
Commissions, and citizen oversight of the police).
62

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .(2013).
For examples of § 1983 lawsuits alleging violations of Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment violations on the part of a
police department, see, e.g., Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d 668
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misconduct because municipalities generally indemnify police officers, and more broadly, this
option rarely addresses “flawed management, policies, or patterns of abuse.” 63 Second, police
officers may face criminal charges for engaging in police misconduct. 64 However, federal
prosecutions—like state criminal prosecutions—are uncommon.65 Lastly, under 42 U.S.C. § 14141,
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) can seek injunctive and declaratory relief against local law
enforcement agencies where a “pattern or practice” of constitutional violations exists. 66 The use of
§ 14141 has been recognized as an important tool to precipitate institutional reform within police
departments,67 in large part because it focuses on the root of police misconduct rather than the bad
deeds of individual officers. There are, however, a number of compelling critiques to this particular
reform model.68 For example, one critique is that § 14141 lacks an “overall philosophy that should
guide the delivery of police services.” 69 For this reason, many of the consent decrees and
memoranda of agreement the DOJ has entered into with the targeted police departments lack a
mechanism to include community members as part of the reform. 70 In addition, Congress failed to
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Davis v. City of New York, 902 F.Supp.2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); and Ligon, 925 F.Supp.2d 478 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
63
Simmons, supra note 9, at 369-70 (citation omitted); see also Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 493
(“[C]onstitutional litigation over police practices necessarily involves discrete aspects of policing (for example, search and
seizure or interrogations), which ignores the impact of the larger organizational culture on police behavior. A department
may have a state of the art policy on reporting use of force incidents, for example, but the informal culture might tolerate or
even encourage officers not to comply fully with the policy.”).

18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) makes it a crime for a person acting “under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, [to] willfully subject[] any person in any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . .” Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2012)
makes it unlawful for “two or more persons [to] conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because
of his having so exercised the same.” But see Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 496 (“[M]uch police conduct, including
the use of force without injury, racial, ethnic or sexual slurs, does not rise to the level of criminal conduct.”).
64

65

Simmons, supra note 9, at 370.

42 U.S.C.A. § 14141 (2012) permits the Attorney General to file a lawsuit to eliminate “a pattern or practice
of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States.” DOJ has entered into consent decrees to reform police misconduct in dozens
of law enforcement agencies nationwide, including the Los Angeles Police Department, the East Haven Police Department,
the New Orleans Police Department, the Detroit Police Department, and the Seattle Police Department. See Special
Litigation
Section
Cases
and
Matters,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#police (last visited June 8, 2014). The settlements typically involve a set
of the following mandated reforms: improved use of force policies, early intervention systems, improved citizen complaint
systems, and improved officer training. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 487. For an in-depth review of the
implementation of § 14141 and the impact of “pattern or practice” litigation on local police departments, see Walker &
Macdonald, supra note 9, at 502-536.
66

67

See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 8, at 201-02.

68

Simmons, supra note 9, at 373.

69

Id.

70

Id. One notable exception to this criticism is the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement—entered into by the
Cincinnati Black United Front, the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc., the City of Cincinnati, and the
Fraternal Order of Police—which, among other things, included “outreach to the entire Cincinnati community through eight
stakeholder groups: African-Americans, social service and religious organizations, businesses and philanthropic groups,
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include a private right of action under § 14141 that would authorize citizens to initiate lawsuits.
Because § 14141 creates an “exclusively executive-run . . . regime,” critics have argued that
enforcement may be compromised by partisanship.71 Another concern is that the federal
government has failed to aggressively exercise its enforcement authority. 72 Yet another critique is
that the reforms are not sustainable, given that there is no process to ensure that the implemented
reforms will continue after the negotiated agreement is terminated. 73 And finally, commentators
note that the current model under § 14141 fails to encourage experimentation and informationsharing among jurisdictions.74
Despite the shortcomings of these legislative measures, they remain important tools in
addressing police misconduct.75 Notwithstanding the availability of these tools, the next section
explores the untapped potential of using the FHA to remedy widespread stop-and-frisk violations.
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A VALUABLE SUPPLEMENTAL TOOL
The Fair Housing Act, enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, makes it
unlawful to, inter alia, “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 76 As a general matter, FHA
claims may be brought under theories of both disparate treatment and disparate impact. 77 Because
this Article focuses on those instances where intentional discrimination cannot be proven, only the
latter theory is relevant here. Despite the uniform acceptance of disparate impact theory under the
FHA among the federal appellate courts presented with the issue (eleven in all), 78 several different

police line officers and spouses, City officials, white citizens, other minorities and youth.” See Collaborative Agreement, In
re Cincinnati Policing, No. C-1-99-317, 2001 WL 1842470, at ¶ 4 (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/permits-auctions-references/collaborative-agreement/.
71

Simmons, supra note 9, at 373.

72

Id. at 375.

73

Id. at 376.

74

Id.

See Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 501 (“Experts generally agree that no single reform strategy has
been completely effective, or is likely to be effective, in establishing consistently high standards of professional conduct.”).
75

76

42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(b) (2013).

77

See, e.g., Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 711 (9th Cir. 2009);
Hack v. President of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
78
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, Final Rule [hereinafter “FHA
Implementation Rule”], 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). See, e.g., Graoch
Assocs. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 2007); Reinhart v.
Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007); Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th
Cir. 2006); Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 740-41 (8th Cir. 2005); Langlois v. Abington
Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2000); Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Jackson
v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484 (9th Cir. 1988); Huntington
Branch Nat’l Assoc. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1998),
aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977); Betsey v. Turtle
Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 987-89 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1984); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
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frameworks have been applied to claims proceeding under that theory over the past four decades. 79
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), which is charged with
interpreting and enforcing the FHA, has always used a three-step burden-shifting approach.80 Under
this approach, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing “that the challenged practice caused
or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.” 81 A practice is defined to have a discriminatory
effect when it “actually or predictably results in disparate impact on a group of persons or creates,
increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 82 If the plaintiff makes this prima facie showing,
then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that “the challenged practice is necessary
to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or
defendant.”83 If the defendant satisfies its burden, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be
served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.” 84
A. The Current Status of the Disparate Impact Theory under the FHA
The Supreme Court questioned this “quiet, if muddled, landscape” 85 in 2011 by granting
certiorari in Magner v. Gallagher86 to address two questions: (1) whether disparate impact claims
are cognizable under the FHA; and (2) if such claims are cognizable, which test should be used to
analyze them.87 Following “pressure from civil rights and housing advocates nationwide” and

1283, 1290-91 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-86 (8th Cir. 1974).
79
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), along with many federal courts of
appeal, has used a three-step burden-shifting approach. FHA Implementation Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462; see, e.g.,
Charleston, 419 F.3d at 740-42; Langlois, 207 F.3d at 49-50; Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 939. One federal appellate
court applies a multi-factor balancing test. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290. Other appellate courts apply a
hybrid between the two. See Graoch, 508 F.3d at 373; Mountain Side Mobile Estates v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56
F.3d 1243, 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 1995). And one court applies different tests for public and private defendants. See Betsey,
736 F.2d at 989 n.5.
80

FHA Implementation Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462.

81

24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2013).

82

Id. § 100.500(a).

83

Id. § 100.500(c).

84
Id. All but one of the federal appellate courts that rely on the burden-shifting approach place the burden on
the plaintiff to prove that a less discriminatory alternative exists. Compare Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v.
Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed, 134 S.Ct. 636 (2013), Gallagher v. Magner, 619
F.3d 823, 834 (8th Cir. 2010), Graoch, 508 F.3d at 373-74, and Mountain Side Mobile Estates, 56 F.3d at 1254 (all placing
the burden of demonstrating less discriminatory alternative on plaintiff), with Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 939 (placing
the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that no less discriminatory alternative exists).
85
Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of
Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 374 (2013).
86

132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).

87

Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 38, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-1032), 2011 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2812. For a thorough analysis of the issues presented by Magner, see Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at
357-64.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol17/iss4/2

CONCEPCION_FINAL_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

10/14/2014 12:59 PM

395

fearing that “a Supreme Court showdown with the landlords could provide a Pyrrhic victory . . .
that weakens the notion of ‘disparate impact’ in civil rights enforcement,” the city withdrew their
petition shortly before oral argument.88 Among those who also expressed concern was former U.S.
Senator and FHA sponsor, Walter Mondale, who stated that if the Supreme Court were to find the
disparate impact test under the FHA unconstitutional, “[t]hat would largely de-fang the Fair
Housing Act.”89
Little more than a year after the dismissal of the writ of certiorari in Magner, the Supreme
Court again granted certiorari to address the validity of disparate impact claims under the FHA, this
time in Township of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.90 The Court limited
review to only one of the questions presented by the petition: “Are disparate impact claims
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?”91 As with Magner, however, the parties settled prior to
oral argument,92 thereby leaving the disparate impact theory under the FHA intact.
B. Police Services: A Municipal Service under the FHA
As stated previously, the Fair Housing Act, in § 3604(b), prohibits discrimination in the
provision of services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling because of
race.93 Although some may perceive the scope of the FHA to be limited to prohibiting
discrimination in the actual sale or rental of a dwelling (for example, refusing to rent an apartment
to a black applicant), such a perception narrowly construes the language and purpose of the FHA. 94
Recognizing this, some courts have held that the FHA covers post-acquisition conduct—
discrimination that occurs after an individual acquires housing. 95 For this reason, discrimination in

88
Kevin Diaz, St. Paul Yanks Housing Fight from High Court, STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/139138084.html; see Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
89

Diaz, supra note 88.

90

Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013). For a thorough
analysis of the issues presented by Mt. Holly, see Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 364-67.
91
Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013); Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2623
(June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1507).
92
Adam Liptak, Fair-Housing Case Is Settled Before It Reaches Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013,
at A18. Despite concern that some members of the Supreme Court considered Mount Holly an opportunity for framing
disparate impact theory in an undesirable way, some commentators have expressed optimism that disparate impact claims
under the FHA will survive any equal protection arguments. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 398-406 & n.280; see also
Eric W.M. Bain, Note, Another Missed Opportunity to Fix Discrimination in Discrimination Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1434, 1459-68 (2012) (explaining the reasons the Supreme Court should recognize the validity of disparate impact
under the FHA); see also Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 414 (“Of course, if the Court eliminates FHA disparate impact
claims, plaintiffs may be able to assert them under state and local laws.”).
93
Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“[Section 3604(b) applies to services generally provided by governmental units such as police . . . protection . . . .”).
94
See Benjamin A. Schepis, Making the Fair Housing Act More Fair: Permitting Section 3604(b) to Provide
Relief for Post-Occupancy Discrimination in the Provision of Municipal Services—A Historical View, 41 U. TOL. L. REV.
411, 416-24 (2010).
95
The federal courts of appeal are currently split as to whether the FHA covers post-acquisition conduct.
According to commentators, the majority of courts favor permitting § 3604(b) claims alleging the discriminatory provision
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the provision of law enforcement services, even after an individual has purchased or rented her
dwelling, falls within the FHA’s coverage.
i.

The Provision of Inadequate Police Services

Courts have recognized the viability of a § 3604(b) claim for a municipality’s failure to
provide minority neighborhoods with adequate police services. 96 In Committee Concerning
Community Improvement v. City of Modesto, for example, residents of predominantly Latino
neighborhoods alleged, inter alia, that the County failed to provide them with adequate municipal
services.97 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the dispatch time (the time lapse between a call
to 911 and the dispatch of an officer) and the total response time (the time lapse between a 911 call
and the arrival of an officer on scene, including dispatch time) of law-enforcement and emergency
response personnel were slower in predominantly Latino neighborhoods than in predominantly
white neighborhoods.98 The difference in dispatch time between the majority Latino neighborhoods
and majority white neighborhoods was, at a minimum, almost two minutes; the difference in
response was, at a minimum, almost one minute. 99 The County offered no reason why dispatch
times were different between neighborhoods.100 Instead, the County argued that response time was

of municipal services to residents, but a significant number do not. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION:
LAW AND LITIGATION § 14:3 (2013); see generally Schepis, supra note 94 (recognizing the two general approaches of
federal courts in their interpretation of § 3604(b)). Compare Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto,
583 F.3d 690, 713-15 (9th Cir. 2009), Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 435-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), Hidden
Vill., LLC v. City of Lakewood, 867 F. Supp. 2d 920, 934-38 (N.D. Ohio 2012), Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04-cv-484-Oc10GRJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43585, at *7-20 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2005), United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972979 (D. Neb. 2004), Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18220, at *24-27 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 9, 2004), and Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138, 1143-44 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (all permitting § 3604(b)
claims alleging the discriminatory provision of municipal services to residents) with Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734,
745-746 (5th Cir. 2005), and Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 328-30 (7th
Cir. 2004) (barring § 3604(b) claims alleging the discriminatory provision of municipal services to residents). But see Bloch
v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (revisiting Halprin, 388 F.3d 327, and discussing post-acquisition claims). Some
courts have found the distinction between “sale” and “rental” to be crucial in determining whether post-acquisition
discrimination is protected by § 3604(b). See, e.g., Richards, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43585, at *11; Jackson v. Comberg,
No. 8:05-cv-1713-T-24TMAP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66405, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2006) (following the reasoning in
Richards). See also Mary Pennisi, Note, A Herculean Leap for the Hard Case of Post-Acquisition Claims: Interpreting Fair
Housing Act Section 3604(b) After Modesto, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1083, 1139-46 (2010) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court should eliminate the distinction between pre- and post-acquisition discrimination and permit plaintiffs to raise claims
under § 3604(b) for discrimination that occurs at any time in the acquisition process).
96

See Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 583 F.3d at 707-709 (residents of predominantly Latino
neighborhoods alleged, inter alia, that the dispatch time and the total response time of law enforcement personnel were
slower in predominantly Latino islands than in predominantly white islands); Campbell, 815 F. Supp. at 44 (AfricanAmerican plaintiffs alleged that the superintendent of police terminated police protection of their home from racially
motivated attacks based on their race).
97

583 F.3d at 696.

98

Id. at 699.

99

Id. at 708.

100

Id.
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the most important measure to the person waiting for the police to arrive. 101 The Ninth Circuit found
that this argument had weight, but disagreed that “as a matter of law, a difference of one minute
can be characterized as not making a ‘meaningful difference’ when one is waiting at one’s home
for law-enforcement or emergency personnel to arrive.” 102 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, reversed
the grant of summary judgment to the County on the plaintiffs’ FHA claims regarding the
discriminatory provision of law enforcement services. 103 The parties subsequently settled the
case.104
ii.

The Provision of Overly Aggressive Police Services

Albeit arguably counterintuitive, the zealous provision of municipal services to minority
neighborhoods may also violate the FHA. For this reason, courts have recognized the viability of a
§ 3604(b) claim for a city’s provision of more aggressive police services to minority
neighborhoods.105
In Doe v. County of Kankakee, residents of a predominantly African American complex
alleged, inter alia, discrimination in rental housing under § 3604(b) by the city of Kankakee, the
county of Kankakee, and the Kankakee Area Metropolitan Enforcement Group (“KAMEG”) 106 for
their aggressive policing tactics.107 The stated goal of KAMEG was to combat the illegal drug trade
and other crimes occurring in local jurisdictions “through policy and procedure, us[ing] aggressive
methods of law enforcement, including the prohibition of loitering for lawful purposes, conducting
arrests without probable cause or warrant, random searches, and excessive force in making
arrests.”108 KAMEG employed these practices in low-income housing throughout the area,
including the plaintiffs’ complex.109 The city entered into an agreement with the owner of the

101

Id.

102

Id. at 709.

103

Id. Although the Ninth Circuit examined the racially disparate statistics in its equal protection analysis,
the Court reinstated the plaintiffs’ FHA claims regarding the provision of law enforcement services, observing that the
plaintiffs’ “factual averments supporting the alleged violations of the FHA are largely the same as the allegations supporting
plaintiffs’ claims that their rights to equal protection were violated by defendants’ actions with regard to municipal services,”
including “an ongoing discriminatory failure to provide adequate law enforcement protection and emergency services . . . .”
Id. at 714-15 & n.15.
104
See Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. Civ. F-04-6121 LJO DLB (E.D. Cal.
June 30, 2011), Dkt. No. 559.
105
See Doe v. County of Kankakee, No. 03 C 8786, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12740 at *14-17 (N.D. Ill. July
6, 2004) (discussing plaintiffs’ allegation, inter alia, that the city, the county, and the joint venture of municipalities
selectively applied aggressive law enforcement tactics to the detriment of the complex’s predominantly African American
residents); cf. Inland Mediation Bd. v. City of Pomona, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing plaintiffs’
allegation, inter alia, that the city sponsored a landlord screening service limited only to landlords in an area comprised of
mostly minority residents and that the city provided different services to this area in violation of § 3604(a)).
106
Doe, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12740, at *4 (describing KAMEG as “a joint venture of municipalities . . .
[which] is composed of members of law enforcement from both the City and County.”).
107

Id. at *2-*3.

108

Id. at *5.

109

Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

CONCEPCION_FINAL_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

398

10/14/2014 12:59 PM

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 17

complex and the management firm for the complex giving authority to the city to control any nonresidents found in the common areas of the complex. 110
The Doe plaintiffs alleged that the county, by stringently enforcing the agreement through
KAMEG, violated § 3604(b) by discouraging the use of the complex’s common areas. 111 The
plaintiffs further alleged that the city, the county, and KAMEG applied these law enforcement
tactics selectively and based on race, color, and national origin. 112 Finding that the plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged a cause of action under § 3604(b), the court denied the county’s motion to
dismiss on this claim.113 The parties subsequently settled the case.114
Application of § 3604(b) to the Overly Aggressive Use of Stop-and-Frisk in Minority
Neighborhoods
Though the issue has not been fully litigated,115 relying on § 3604(b) of the FHA to combat
the aggressive use of stop-and-frisk practices in minority neighborhoods deserves some attention,
particularly when the DOJ has failed to act pursuant to its “pattern or practice” authority. To do so,
a minority resident-plaintiff, with the assistance of an expert,116 would have to demonstrate that the
practices of her local police department disproportionately affect minority residents, and that police
officers engage in more stop-and-frisk activity in her minority neighborhood than in non-minority
neighborhoods.117 Such an effort would require documentation measuring the level of police
enforcement—namely the practice of stop-and-frisk. If the resident meets her burden, which she is
likely to do given that aggressive law enforcement tactics tend to be concentrated “in the ‘hood,”118
then the local police department would have the burden to prove that its stop-and-frisk practices are
110

Id. at *6.

111

Id. at *15.

112

Id.

113

Id. at *15-*16.

114

See Doe v. County of Kankakee, No. 1:03-cv-08786, (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2005), Dkt No. 49.

115
See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 202-13, 244-250, Davis v. City of New York, 902 F.Supp.2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
28, 2010) (No. 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS)) (pleading a disparate impact claim under the FHA for the NYPD’s discriminatory stopand-frisk practices in New York City Housing Authority buildings), withdrawn, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45601 (plaintiffs
consented to the dismissal of their FHA disparate impact claim); Complaint at ¶¶ 186-96, 205, Ligon v. City of New York,
925 F.Supp.2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012) (pleading a disparate impact claim under the FHA for the NYPD’s
discriminatory stop-and-frisk practices in private residential buildings enrolled in the Trespass Affidavit Program).
116
See Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 383 (noting the importance of having an expert to develop the
statistical analysis necessary to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact); see, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan et al., Race and
Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 697 (2012) (comparing trespass and other
enforcement activities in New York City Housing Authority developments with the same parameters of enforcement in
similarly situated areas to determine if public housing in New York is targeted for trespass enforcement). But cf. Susan D.
Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011) (“It is today very
rare for plaintiffs other than highly sophisticated and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, to prevail
under Title VII on a disparate impact theory.”).
117
In New York City, for example, police officers are required to complete a UF-250 form, also known as a
“Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet,” after each Terry stop. Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 572. Each side of the form
contains checkboxes and fields in which officers are required to indicate the nature of the stop, the location of the stop, and
the circumstances leading to and justifying the stop. Id. & app. A.

ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 121 (“[W]hen police go looking for drugs, they look in the ’hood. Tactics
that would be political suicide in an upscale white suburb are not even newsworthy in poor black and brown communities.”).
118

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol17/iss4/2
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necessary to “achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests” 119—most
likely combating high crime.120 Put another way, the local police department must demonstrate that
its level of enforcement activities in minority neighborhoods can be explained by crime conditions
in those neighborhoods. The department engaging in racially discriminatory behavior likely would
not be able to meet this burden; instead, expert analysis would reveal that, even after controlling for
crime, law enforcement activities in minority neighborhoods remain racially skewed. 121 If the police
department meets its burden of demonstrating that high crime in minority neighborhoods justifies
its practices, however, then the resident must prove that these interests can be served by another
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.122
Challenging stop-and-frisk practices by relying on an FHA disparate impact theory has
practical significance.123 First, unlike the DOJ’s “pattern or practice” authority under § 14141, the
FHA provides a private right of action, meaning that individual plaintiffs can sue without waiting
for the federal government to act. Challenges to the stop-and-frisk practices of police departments,
therefore, would not be compromised by partisan politics, nor would they depend on the resources
of a federal agency.124 Second, unlike an Equal Protection claim under § 1983, an FHA claim for
the provision of overly aggressive municipal services can be premised on an impact theory, rather
than being constrained to proving intent. 125 Third, the threat of FHA liability may encourage
municipalities and their police departments to adopt best practices. 126 Finally, an FHA claim
119

24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2014).

120

See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 116, at 703 (noting that, in response to a legal challenge, the police could
argue that the higher crime rates in public housing motivated the higher rate of sweeps).
121

See id. at 698, 718-22 (demonstrating that the level of trespass enforcement in public housing cannot be
explained by crime); Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 560-62; NY ATTORNEY GENERAL 1999 STOP & FRISK REPORT, supra note 7,
at 119 (noting that, even when crime was accounted for statistically, racial minorities were stopped at a higher rate than
whites).
122
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (2014). See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth
Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 221-25 (2011) (proposing a more “particularized
approach” to deploying officers in “high-crime areas” through the use of mapping technology so as to “respect[] the liberty
of individuals living in high-crime neighborhoods and minimize[] the reputational damage done by an overbroad
generalization”); Fagan, supra note 116, at 720-21 (finding that the study’s results suggest that “race and ethnicity play an
important role in the conduct of enforcement in public housing, a role that is present after controlling for other policyrelevant factors [such as crime] and social conditions, as well as for the allocation of police resources and the intensity of
policing tactics”).
123

See Robert G. Schwemm, The Fair Housing Act After 40 Years: Continuing the Mission to Eliminate
Housing Discrimination and Segregation, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 789-90 (2008) (observing that the value of FHA coverage
would be in those cases where its procedures or relief are more favorable—e.g., broader standing to sue; agency authority
to enforce; different statutes of limitations; a well-established “continuing violation theory”; and potential authorization of
punitive damage awards). But see Seicshnaydre, supra note 85 (finding that an analysis of forty years of appellate case law
demonstrates that courts have a narrow view of FHA disparate impact theory).
124

See Simmons, supra note 9, at 373, 375.

See Schwemm, supra note 123, at 789-90; see also Seicshnaydre, supra note 85, at 414 (“[T]he disparate
treatment standard by itself is an insufficient method of proof to capture the policies and procedures used to maintain racial
segregation in the United States”).
125

126
See Brief of the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 21-24, Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (Oct. 28, 2013); cf.
Walker & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 495 (noting that some scholars have argued that the fear of tort litigation, as opposed
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reinforces the notion that place matters. Blacks “remain the most racially segregated population in
the nation,”127 followed by Latinos.128 These populations are “segregated not just from whites but
also from opportunities that are critical to the quality of life, stability, and advancement. Where one
lives determines one’s connection to jobs, high-performing neighborhood schools, green space,
quality retail stores, fresh foods, and safety.” 129 Living in a racially segregated building or
neighborhood forces residents of color to pay a price—overzealous policing—that those living
elsewhere do not.130 When the level of policing is not proportional to the relevant crime conditions,
or when criminality occurs in significant numbers in non-minority areas and yet does not receive
law enforcement attention, the FHA is available to ensure that the price minority residents pay is
not higher than it should be.
III. CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court recognized in Terry forty-five years ago, “it is simply fantastic to
urge that [a frisk] performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps
facing a wall with his hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’” 131 This has not changed. If anything, it
is more true today, as local police departments, by increasingly relying on stop-and-frisk tactics in
minority communities, have demonstrated that place matters. Where residents live determines the
nature of their relationship with the police. For minority residents, that relationship is often
corrosive, built on the false premise that the police are present to protect them when the reality is
the opposite: they are there to oppress and harass them in a racialized manner. The federal
legislative measures typically relied on to remedy this kind of police misconduct have fallen short
of effectuating institutional reform. Challenging a police department’s discriminatory provision of
police services to minority neighborhoods by bringing disparate impact claims under the Fair
Housing Act represents a viable supplement.

to actual lawsuits, has been a major stimulus to police reform since the mid-1970s).
127
LEADERSHIP LEARNING COMMUNITY, LEADERSHIP & RACE: HOW TO DEVELOP AND SUPPORT
LEADERSHIP THAT CONTRIBUTES TO RACIAL JUSTICE [hereinafter “LEADERSHIP & RACE REPORT”] 6 (2010), available at
http://leadershiplearning.org/system/files/Leadership%20and%20Race%20FINAL_Electronic_072010.pdf.
128
JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS AND
ASIANS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1, 4, 15-16 (2011), available at http://www.s4.brown.edu
/us2010/Data/Report/report0727.pdf; see also JOHN R. LOGAN & WENQUAN ZHANG, GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOODS; NEW
EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2010, at 1 (2011) (“About half the black population and forty percent of Hispanics still live in
neighborhoods without a white presence.”), http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/globalfinal2.pdf; see also
POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNSEL & NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES: VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION
OF
ALL
FORMS
OF
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION,
at
i
(2008),
available
at
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/FinalCERDHousingDiscriminationReport.pdf (“Residential segregation is an insidious and
persistent fact of American life. Discrimination on the basis of race, while on the decline according to some statistics,
continues to pervade nearly every aspect of the housing market in the United States.”).
129

LEADERSHIP & RACE REPORT, supra note 127, at 6.

130

See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 129 (observing that even seemingly race-neutral factors, such as
location, for the concentration of law enforcement resources in ghetto communities operate in a discriminatory fashion).
131

392 U.S. at 14.
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